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In recent years, the insurance industry has come under attack for
engaging in "discriminatory" practices against minorities. Critics
assert that black applicants for insurance are often charged higher
rates than white applicants, or are even denied certain kinds of in-
surance altogether.' In response, insurance companies offer the fol-
lowing defense: any difference in rates between racial groups simply
reflects the underlying riskiness of the average white and black ap-
plicant in society. In other words, insurance companies suggest that
they have a perfectly rational reason to discriminate against minori-
ties. On average, minorities are more expensive to insure.2
The profit-making objective of this kind of "rational discrimina-
tion"3 distinguishes it from bigotry or "irrational discrimination. ' 4
t The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contributions of Aaron Rap-
paport, George Priest, Catharine MacKinnon, and Henry Hansmann.
1. See Gastel, Rate Regulation, Insurance Information Institute, May, 1990, at 1
(NAACP filed suit against auto insurer for race discrimination); Hamilton, Insurance Co.
Accused of Bias Asks Court to Stop Md Panel From Holding Hearing, Wash. Post, Mar. 18,
1979, § B, at 1 (Maryland Human Relations Commission charges Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society with race discrimination); Ellis, Insurance Stereotyping Robs Women-and Men,
367 Civ. LIBERTIES 7, 7 (1989) (insurers engage in racial rate-making).
In this paper, I will focus on discrimination against Blacks. The principles I develop,
however, should be directly applicable, in varying degrees, to other groups which have
been affected by economic discrimination.
2. Evidence of a correlation between race and risk exists in at least some areas of
insurance. E.g. Bradford & Bates, Loan Default among Black Entrepreneurs Forming New Cen-
tral City Businesses, 17 Q. REV. EcON. & Bus. 25, 26-27 (Autumn 1977) (small business
ventures owned by Blacks more likely to fail than those owned by Whites); Ellis, supra
note 1, at 7 (Blacks die earlier than Whites). For the purposes of this paper, I will accept
this evidence as valid.
3. See, e.g., Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 108 (1986)
(where race and risk correlate, discrimination may be "rational" or "efficient"); Stiglitz,
Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 293 nn. 17 & 18
(1973) (describing rational race-based decision-making).
4. Irrational discrimination, or bigotry, is also known as "intentional" discrimina-
tion. Bigotry is irrational, from an economic point of view, because it involves decision-
making according to a criterion-race-which is seen as irrelevant to the decision being
made. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971); Arrow, The
Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (0. Ashenfelter and A.
Rees eds. 1973). But see Darity, What's Left of the Economic Theory of Discrimination? in THE
QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 335 (S.
Schulman & W. Darity, Jr., eds. 1984) (suggesting that bigotry might be quite rational,
as it can serve to exclude "outsiders," preserving scarce positions and benefits for one's
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While bigotry is generally symptomatic of racial animus, rational
discrimination is motivated only by financial concerns. Hence, it is
difficult to incorporate any element of fault, or malevolent intent,
into an analysis of rational discrimination. The only intent neces-
sary to rationally discriminate is the intent to maximize profits.
Rational discrimination occurs in many areas, in addition to insur-
ance, where race correlates with economic variables. Mortgage
lending, where race and credit-worthiness are linked,5 and employ-
ment, where race and education or skill may be correlated,6 are two
common examples. The insurance industry, however, is perhaps
the best place to examine the paradigm. Insurers, after all, are in
the business of making quantitative decisions based on proxies for
risk. Also, in the insurance market, it is relatively easy to identify the
distribution of benefits and burdens that would result from interfer-
ence with rational discrimination.
In several insurance markets, insurance companies have been pro-
hibited by law or custom from engaging in "overt" rational discrimi-
nation-that is, from explicitly classifying individuals on the basis of
race.7  Insurance companies, however, often use non-racial
predictors of risk that are closely correlated with race and, hence,
have a disparate impact on minorities. While some jurisdictions
prohibit racially correlated classifications such as geographical loca-
tion ("redlining"), no state has instituted a comprehensive prohibi-
tion of "impact" rational discrimination.8 A few jurisdictions, in
own group). Additionally, as this paper will make clear, race may become relevant to cer-
tain economic decisions.
This paper will not focus on bigotry or "intentional discrimination" since this form of
discrimination is clearly prohibited under a number of laws (see, e.g., U.S. CONST.
Amend. XIV, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978)), and is
relatively uncontroversial at this point in history.
5. See, e.g., Nash, Panel Is Told of Racial Bias in Lending, N.Y. Times, May, 17, 1990, at
A17 (lenders claim disparate terms reflect racial differences in risk).
6. See, e.g., Willborn, The Disparae Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34
Am. U.L. REv. 799, 810 (1985) (employer may make decision based on education, which
differs between races due to past discrimination).
7. A number of states have laws prohibiting the overt use of race by insurers in rate
making. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304-22
(1989); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1183(e) (1987). Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978), prohibits rational discrimination in some forms
of insurance offered by employers. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) (rational discrimination prohibited in employer-of-
fered benefits plan). Many insurers have stopped using overt racial classifications, even
where the use of race is not prohibited by law, as a matter of custom or professional
pressure. See Ellis, supra note 1, at 7 (National Association of Insurance Commissioners
"vigorously condemned" the use of race-based rates at its 1988 Annual Meeting).
8. Compare, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-210-5 (1985) (prohibiting "redlining")
with MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-18-210-5(a) (1985) (permitting use of otherwise prohibited
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fact, actually appear to require "impact" rational discrimination
under certain conditions.9
As the state of the insurance industry indicates, policy makers and
academics have reached little consensus about how to address the
implications of rational discrimination. This Current Topic argues
that rational discrimination should not be viewed simply as a ques-
tion of profitability or financial interests, but must also be ap-
proached from a moral perspective. Part One examines the
underlying cause of rational discrimination in one particular insur-
ance market,' 0 locating its ultimate source in the historical injustices
perpetrated against Blacks. This section condemns rational discrim-
ination for perpetuating and even exacerbating social inequalities.
The analysis suggests that our society will not fully succeed in re-
ducing economic asymmetries between Blacks and Whites unless it
confronts rational, as well as irrational, discrimination."I
Parts Two and Three examine two alternative methods of inter-
fering with rational discrimination in insurance: prohibiting the
practice altogether or compensating for its deleterious effects
classification for "a business purpose which is not a mere pretext for unfair
discrimination").
9. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(b) (West 1990) (insurers should use "customary
and reasonable or actuarially sound underwriting practices"). Note, however, that a
California insurer could not overtly rationally discriminate-use race itself as a classifica-
tion-even if it were a "sound underwriting practice,". CAL. INS. CODE § 679.71 (West
1990).
10. The insurance market for entrepreneurs, such as construction contractors, is
used as an illustration primarily because of the importance economists have placed on
entrepreneurial markets in explaining the persistence of racial economic asymmetries.
E.g., Palmer, Equality, Incentives, and Economic Policy, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 123, 123 (1980)
(concentration of Blacks in low-productivity jobs is major cause of racial income dispari-
ties). Additionally, this market has received a high degree of publicity in the wake of
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), a recent Supreme Court
decision that deals with anti-discrimination principles.
11. Although there is some disagreement over the extent of racial wage and occupa-
tional asymmetries and whether these gaps are decreasing, it is virtually undisputed that
these asymmetries exist. As to wage gaps, compare Freeman, Black Economic Progress after
1964: Who has Gained and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247, 251 (S. Rosen ed.
1981) (usual weekly earning of non-White males up from 69% of White male earnings in
1967 to 78% in 1976) with Bates, Black Economic Well.Being Since the 1950s, 12 REV.
BLACK POL. EcoN. 5, 7 (Spring 1984) (non-White family income relative to White family
income up only I%, from 59% to 60%, between 1967 and 1976). As to occupational
gaps, compare Freeman, Black Economic Progress Since 1964, in CURRENT ISSUES AM. EcON.
173, 175 (R. Puth ed. 1980) (likelihood of black college graduate obtaining managerial
job compared with likelihood for white college graduate up 26%, from 41% in 1964 to
67% in 1975) with Palmer, supra note 10, at 124 (ratio of white collar to service workers
1.08:1 for Blacks compared with 4.2:1 for Whites in 1974). Wage and occupational gaps
are clearly related: if Blacks cannot gain access to high paying jobs, it follows that their




through a subsidy. While either approach will reduce the correla-
tion between race and risk, this analysis suggests that a subsidy of-
fers significant moral and practical advantages over a prohibition.
L Potential Bases for Interfering with Rational Discrimination
A precondition for rational discrimination in insurance is that race
must be correlated with risk. Any such relationship, however, must
be presumptively suspect, given our society's belief that the races
are inherently equal.' 2 To explain a correlation between being
black and being "high risk" by suggesting that Blacks are inherently
more prone to risky behavior would not only be racist but would
also lack any evidentiary basis.' 3
The difference might be explained as a product of "free choice":
that Blacks, for some reason, choose disproportionately riskier be-
havior than Whites.14 To argue that Blacks are inherently less ra-
tional than Whites in making risk decisions, however, is again both
racist and unsupported.' 5 Similarly, to claim that Blacks place a dif-
ferent "value" on risky behavior also lacks any convincing proof.' 6
12. "[l]n the eye of the law, there is ... no superior, dominant... class of citizens."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. Cf. Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMEMTICA 263 (1979) (cognitive theory of risky decision-making, no suggestion of
racial disparity in decision making skills); Machina, Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems
Solved and Unsolved, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 121 (1987) (review of extensive literature updating
Kahneman and Tversky theory; no suggestion of racial disparity in decision-making
skills).
14. Choice-based models of racial inequality have been suggested by the U.S.
Supreme Court. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 726 (1989)
("Black ... career and entrepreneurial choices" may explain "dearth of minority partici-
pation" in construction contracting market). Such theories have been suggested by
some economists as well. See, e.g., T. SowELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 280 (1981) (suggesting
that differences in career choices between ethnic groups might result from different atti-
tudes towards learning and self-improvement).
15. See supra note 13.
16. Certain "choice" theories of racial differences imply that Blacks have more to
gain than Whites in taking certain risks. Since the gain from taking a risk is properly
measured in terms of utility rather than money, Blacks could conceivably make decisions
which make them look systematically less well off in monetary terms although they are
really equally well off in utility terms. For example, Sowell suggests that Blacks might
choose less education than Whites (that is, they might choose to accept the risks of en-
tering the job market with less education) as a result of ethnic or community norms. T.
SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 163 (1975). The implication is that conforming to such
norms yields utility. The problem with this theory is that we live in a society where
utility seems closely tied to money. Unless Blacks get less utility from money (i.e., more
utility from alternatives to money, such as leisure time), it is difficult to imagine how a
norm which results in lower income could survive. There appears to be no evidence that
Blacks have different income-utility preferences than Whites. Given this fact, and the
history of race discrimination in this country, it seems fair to presume that most of the
racial income (and risk) differdntials which persist today cannot be adequately explained
by choice theory.
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One might argue, more reasonably, that Blacks' opportunities to
choose less risky activities differ, on average, from those of Whites.
Under this hypothesis, Blacks are compelled to undertake more
risky activities not by choice, but by necessity. An illustration in an
entrepreneurial market may clarify the relationship between risk and
opportunity.
A. Opportunities in Small Business
One important area where race seems to correlate with risk is en-
trepreneurship. It appears that small business ventures owned by
Blacks are less likely to succeed than those owned by Whites. 17 This
correlation should directly affect insurance rates for policies that
cover the risk of business failure, such as bonding for construction
contractors.' 8 Bonding is a form of insurance that protects the
buyer of construction services against the risk that a contractor will
default; contractors generally provide bonding as a matter of either
law or convention. 19 Thus, this form of insurance is considered to
be a precondition for doing business.
Economic research suggests that two major factors that account
for the correlation between race and entrepreneurial risk are experi-
ence and wealth/income. 20 These studies show that black potential
entrepreneurs have less relevant business experience than white po-
tential entrepreneurs, reducing their prospects for success. Further,
having less wealth/income prior to starting the business venture,
black entrepreneurs are less likely than white entrepreneurs to have
a financial "safety net" that might enable them to "feed" a marginal
business venture until it becomes profitable.
Wealth/income and experience, however, seem to serve less as
explanations for Blacks' relative disadvantage than as symptoms of
the problem. After all, part of the reason Blacks lack the resources
and experience to enter a market is because they have been unable
to succeed in the market in the first place. What is needed is a fuller
17. Bradford & Bates, supra note 2, at 26-27.
18. Indeed, Black contractors have reported that they often pay relatively high rates
for bonding, making it difficult for them to compete. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 724 (1989) (citing Brief for Appellant).
19. See Note, The Nonperpetuation of Discrimination in Public Contracting A Justification for
State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides after Wygant, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1797, 1807
n.62, 1808 n.65 (1988) (bonding required for virtually all government contracts; difficult
to break into contracting market without winning government contracts).
20. See, e.g., Bradford & Bates, supra note 2, at 29. In their research, Bradford and
Bates treat wealth and income as two distinct indicators of risk. In my analysis, however,





economic understanding of the risk of entrepreneurial failure, an
understanding that incorporates both present and historical obsta-
cles to minority opportunity. A "cost structure" analysis of risk pro-
vides one enlightening approach.2 1
B. Cost, Delay, and Disadvantage
Risk, for an entrepreneur, depends largely on her cost structure.22
The higher her cost structure is, relative to her competitors' cost
structure, the greater will be her risk of failure in the market.23 This
effect will be reinforced by the fact that a significant cost faced by
any producer is the cost of risk. This cost is manifested in the pre-
mium she will have to pay for insurance such as bonding. A high-
cost/high-risk competitor must pay high insurance premiums, fur-
ther adding to her cost.
Racial differences in risk might thus be explained by racially dis-
parate cost structures. Indeed, intentional discrimination almost in-
evitably imposes a cost on its victims relative to those who are not so
violated.2 4 It is fairly uncontroversial, for this reason, that where vic-
tims of intentional discrimination can locate and identify a
21. Cost structure analyses are not new to the discrimination area. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that such analyses might be useful in examining the continuing ef-
fects of past intentional discrimination on economic opportunity. See, e.g., Cruz, An
Antitrust Approach to Equal Employment Opportunity, 55 FLA. BJ. 261, 261 (1981) (pointing
out similarities between occupational discrimination and monopolistic exclusion).
Others have noted how specific barriers to entry contribute to racial occupational dis-
parities. See Note, supra note 19, at 1807 (highlighting several economic barriers to entry
in the construction industry to show why race-neutral policies might exacerbate the ef-
fects of discrimination); Norton & Norton, A Setback for Minority Businesses, LEGAL TIMEs,
May 1, 1989, at 31 (arguing that discriminatory practices have limited access to the pre-
requisites for significant business development). To my knowledge, however, no author
has systematically applied such an analysis to explain the correlation between race and
risk and the moral implications of such a relationship.
22. The term "cost structure" is used to describe the way an entrepreneur's costs
vary over time. An entrepreneur's production costs can generally be imagined as a
curve that starts high and decreases downward over time as she gains experience and
becomes more efficient. In determining her prospects for success, looking only at pres-
ent costs will not be fully informative; it is necessary to look at future costs as well.
Thus, I will speak of cost structure, rather than static costs. Any isolated cost encoun-
tered by an entrepreneur will affect her cost structure.
23. Success in the market will depend almost exclusively on cost structure. A high
cost producer generally will face one of two options: She can charge the same price as
her competitors, accepting a smaller profit margin on each good sold, or she can raise
her prices, keeping profit margins constant but selling fewer goods. Either way, she will
earn less total revenue than her competitors, reducing her likelihood of success in the
market.
24. A slave, for example, is stripped of any profit she might earn from her labor,
while a freewoman retains the value of hers. A Black freewoman who is barred from the
market or occupation of her choice loses any profits that she might gain in that market.
A bar to the market might take the form of a "Jim Crow" law, or "custom" (enforced by
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perpetrator, they can recover those costs.2 5 Unfortunately, racial
cost differentials may persist well beyond the time when acts of in-
tentional discrimination have ceased-and beyond the time when
the perpetrators are likely to be identified or held liable for those
acts.26
One might think that cost differentials between Blacks and Whites
would slowly subside once intentional discrimination ends; that, at
the very least, a successful black entrepreneur might earn enough
profit to pay off the cost imposed on her by past injustice. These
costs, however, are unlikely to disappear during the lifetime of
the producer. Even if a black producer, B, tried to cover the addi-
tional cost out of her sales revenues, a competing white producer,
W, could use comparable revenues to invest in her business to main-
tain her cost advantage. B's competitive disadvantage will persist,
or even increase, depending on the relative success of W's
investments.27
Competitive advantage-and, hence, competitive disadvantage-
can also be passed down through subsequent generations. First, a
parent like W can leave a successful business to her heirs, giving
them a strong advantage over their peers who lack this opportunity.
Such heirs are spared virtually all start-up costs and often already
possess a significant lead in experience, name recognition, and
wealth/income. They have both lower cost structures and greater
resources to cover those costs. Descendants of parents without such
the threat of racist violence). Alternatively, a bar might result from intentional discrimi-
nation in other areas; for example, a would-be producer may have been denied an edu-
cation or other qualification necessary for market entry because of her race. Even if she
can actually enter the market, furthermore, discriminatory sellers of supplies can in-
crease her costs and discriminatory buyers can reduce her profits.
25. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975) ("It is... the
purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763
(1976) (aff gAlbermarle). See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title.VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (1978) (granting courts broad equitable power to fashion compensating
remedies for victims of unlawful discrimination).
26. Many of the parties responsible for the most egregious forms of discrimination
(i.e., those forms that imposed the greatest and most persistent racial cost differentials)
are most likely dead. See, e.g., DeCanio, Accumulation and Discrimination in the Postbellum
South, in MARKET INSTItrTONS AND EcONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE NEW SOUTH 1865-1900
103-04 (G. Walton &J. Shepherd eds. 1981) (slavery and emancipation without assets
are major causes of present-day racial economic inequalities). Liability may also be pre-
cluded because many of the discriminatory acts that imposed large costs on black produ-
cers were legal at the time they were committed. Additionally, even after such
discriminatory acts had been prohibited by law, responsibility may be dispersed among
so many parties and markets, and over such a length of time, that the portion imposed
by any one perpetrator has become too attenuated for an effective legal remedy.
27. No reason exists to expect that Whites will make less efficacious business invest-




advantages will suffer when competing against established family
businesses. Second, even if descendants of advantaged parents do
not benefit from inheriting a family business, they generally will be
given or will inherit more assets than descendants of disadvantaged
parents, making capital formation in any new business endeavor eas-
ier and less costly.28 Thus, B's daughter is likely to inherit much of
the disadvantage that B may have suffered during her lifetime as a
result of intentional discrimination, while she is unlikely to inherit
any antidiscrimination law claims that B might have had.
It is possible, of course, that the costs imposed by past intentional
discrimination might eventually disappear. Bad investment deci-
sions by white entrepreneurs and inheritance taxes may whittle away
cost differentials.29 Yet even if the cost structures faced by black and
white producers or their heirs were eventually to reach the same
level, the cost differential, while it existed, may have delayed Blacks'
entry into the market. B (or B's heirs) may be in a position to enter
the market with the same cost structure that W faced when she en-
tered the market; but B will only be in this position after several
years (and possibly generations) have elapsed. This delay, itself,
represents a form of disadvantage.
Producers like W who have already entered the market may have
been able to build brand loyalty, entrenching themselves in the mar-
ket. To woo customers away from such incumbents, a new entrant
like B will have to offer some incentive-generally, a lower price
than that offered by incumbents. ° Consequently, a new entrant with
a comparable cost structure will face a disadvantage in attempting to
28. This argument finds support in DeCanio's research on the effects of initial asset
distribution on relative group incomes. DeCanio, supra note 26, at 125 (even under
optimal economic conditions and in the absence of postbellum discrimination, Blacks
would nevertheless face a substantial income gap for an extremely long time as a result
of being emancipated without any property-by being stripped of all wealth as slaves).
This problem may be compounded by apparent difficulties in Black families of transmit-
ting any gains which are made through subsequent generations. See Dachter, Race/Sex
Differences in the Effects of Background on Achievement, in 9 FivE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMI-
LIEs-PArERNs OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 359, 359 (M. Hill, D. Hill and J. Morgan eds.
198 1) (Black heredity-the ability to pass on family economic gains-appears to be less
effective than White heredity).
29. It should be noted, however, that inheritance taxes are unlikely to be a particu-
larly efficacious way to eliminate cost differentials. Even if we assume that present an-
tidiscrimination laws succeed in preventing new acts of intentional discrimination, these
laws have been in place for only a short period. Title VII, for instance, was not made
effective until 1965. Not many inheritance tax cycles have passed since that time. Addi-
tionally, each tax cycle eliminates only a percentage (and often a relatively small percent-
age) of any existing cost difference. Thus, while the difference will become
progressively smaller, it will never actually disappear.
30. Theoretically, the new entrant might lure customers from an entrenched incum-
bent by offering a higher quality product. This strategy, however, does not avoid price
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penetrate an established market.3 ' Her cost structure must be
superior.3 2
In summary, a cost structure analysis suggests that markets tend
to maintain disparities arising from past intentional discrimination
in two principal ways. First, cost differentials are likely to be sus-
tained between competitors, and even between their heirs. In addi-
tion, even if these cost differentials were to subside, the delay in
entry that they cause can itself be viewed as a disadvantage. For
both these reasons, insurers face a market skewed by past inten-
tional discrimination and characterized by Black competitive disad-
vantage. To maximize profits, these insurers will rationally
discriminate, charging higher rates for black entrepreneurs than for
similar white entrepreneurs. In one sense, then, rational discrimina-
tion serves as a "reflection" of the disparities introduced into the
market by past intentional discrimination.
In a deeper sense, however, rational discrimination also operates
as a critical mechanism in a troubling cycle: it translates black disad-
vantage into high insurance rates which, in turn, further prevent or
delay Blacks' entry into the market, sustaining their high risk status.
Preventing insurers from rationally discriminating would interrupt
this cycle. It would relieve Blacks of at least some of their disadvan-
tage, allowing them to compete successfully in the market. In this
sense, rational discrimination serves to perpetuate, or even exacer-
bate, racial economic disparities.33
competition. Such an entrant essentially enters a sub-market (for high quality products),
in which she must compete with prices set by other high quality producers.
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32. The disadvantage from delay in the scenario above will occur only if the market
has become less competitive (i.e., more "monopolistic") as a result of entrenchment.
When any producer enters the market, she will face a certain level of entrenchment.
Even the first producer in a market must woo customers away from entrenched produ-
cers of substitute goods. The costs of overcoming such entrenchment and developing a
market niche, therefore, can be viewed as part of any entrant's cost structure. Thus, if
the level of entrenchment in a market remains stable and the effects of past discrimina-
tion have subsided, both W and B will face similar entry costs. If the level of entrench-
ment rises over time, however (as is likely), the cost of entry will rise as well. B will have
to cover the added cost which has resulted from delay.
Even if the level of entrenchment in a market remains stable, however, delay may
impose a burden on B which W was spared. During the time in which B could not enter
the market because of her high cost structure, she was effectively forced to accept some
less preferred (and presumably less lucrative) alternative employment. That is, she
faced an "opportunity cost" as a result of not being able to enter the market for the
delay period, irrespective of entrenchment.
33. To the extent that rational discrimination slows the reduction in racial cost dif-
ferences, it causes unnecessary delay in market entry. If rational discrimination were
prevented, these cost differences would subside more quickly and marginal Blacks would
be able to enter sooner. See infra Section II. The injury caused by this delay would not
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C. Moral Implications of Rational Discrimination
Even to the extent that rational discrimination reflects an unjust
distribution-and even to the extent that this practice can be seen as
a factor in maintaining this distribution-it remains unclear that
something should be done about it. As a society, we might refrain
from remedying one injustice where the remedy is likely to result in
new injustice. This danger seems particularly acute where the rem-
edy is not based on fault.
In its starkest terms the moral issue raised by rational discrimina-
tion can be framed as follows: Assume that W has some good that is
undeserved. As a result, B does not have this good, although she
deserves it. W, however, did not personally take this good. from B,
nor did she commission its taking. Hence, the good has been un-
justly distributed, but there is no identifiable wrongdoer. W might
have a moral duty to give the good to B. Yet it is not clear why W
should be forced to honor that moral duty; after all, W committed
no wrong. Traditionally, redistribution-especially racial redistri-
bution-has been justified only when fault can be assigned to a
specific party.34
In certain areas, however, society consciously redistributes bene-
fits and burdens in the absence of fault. Perhaps the best example
comes from another insurance controversy: no-fault motor vehicle
liability. The no-fault paradigm rests on the belief that when the
benefits of a good are widely enjoyed throughout society, but the
costs of the good fall disproportionately on a particular subgroup
within society, cost spreading-redistribution-might be justified.3 5
For example, motor vehicles provide tremendous benefits to most
members of society. The costs of driving, however, do not fall
evenly among those who enjoy its benefits. Those unfortunate
occur but for rational discrimination. In this sense, rational discrimination causes disad-
vantage; it exacerbates the cycle of exclusion.
34. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 78, 80 (1986) ("sin-based paradigm" underlies affirmative action and racial redis-
tribution jurisprudence). The prospect of redistribution without fault carries with it the
danger of creating a moral hazard. See Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure
Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 4 (1983) (moral
hazard results from interference with competitive allocation of costs of risk; may elimi-
nate incentives to avoid unnecessary risk). In addition, faultless racial redistribution
might permit unrestrained favoritism by government. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723 (racial redistribution without fault has "no logical stop-
ping point") (citation omitted); Croson, 109 S. Ct at 722 (O'Connor, J., for plurality)
(indicating fear that affirmative action plan benefiting Blacks where Blacks comprise
50% of population and majority of City Council might represent political opportunism,
rather than remedy for past discrimination).
35. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACClDErrs 261-63, 308 (1970).
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enough to get into an accident bear a disproportionate portion of
the cost of driving. If we believe that getting into an accident is
largely a matter of chance, we might want to spread some of this
cost from the victims of accidents to those non-victims who enjoy
the benefits of driving.
A fault-based system distributes the costs only to those who are,
in some sense, responsible for accidents. In contrast, a no-fault sys-
tem (used to supplement a fault system), would provide relief for
those victims unlucky enough to be in an accident where fault could
not be established or, possibly, where the person at fault could not
pay. The cost of this relief would be borne by-or "spread"
among-all of the beneficiaries of driving. The cost of faultless acci-
dents, after all, is a cost of driving.
The economic benefits or goods of society are enjoyed even more
widely than the benefits of driving. Discrimination, like accidents,
can lead to a disproportionate distribution of the costs of these ben-
efits. As with driving, if those who are at "fault" cannot be identi-
fied (as is likely), 36 the costs of discrimination will lie on its victims.
Unlike the driving example, however, these victims are not chosen
randomly. Racial discrimination has systematically victimized
Blacks. Further, non-victim members of society-Whites-have sys-
tematically benefitted from this victimization even though they have
committed no wrong and are thus not at "fault. 37 Thus, the motor
vehicle no-fault paradigm suggests that we may be willing to redis-
tribute in the absence of fault when a good has been distributed
unfairly. The no-fault paradigm seems particularly compelling in
the context of discrimination. 38
In addition to spreading the costs of a "no-fault" risk, there are a
number of other reasons we might want to remedy an unfair distri-
bution of benefits. Such a desire might be based on expectations of
36. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 24 (pervasive disadvantage from discrimination-implies pervasive
advantage to non-victims). See also Riedsel, Racial Discrimination and White Economic Bene-fits, 60 Soc. Sci. Q. 120, 126-28 (1979) (empirical data shows that discrimination against
non-Whites raises White incomes.)
38. No-fault redistribution is more compelling in the context of discrimination than
in the context of motor vehicle accidents for two reasons. First, the costs of discrimina-
tion are more likely to be beyond the reach of fault systems than the costs of motor
vehicle accidents. See supra note 26. Thus, there is likely to be more need for a no-fault
remedy in the discrimination context. Additionally, in contrast to the motor vehicle con-
text, it is difficult to imagine that a victim of a discriminatory "accident" could be consid-
ered to be a contributing cause of the accident. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text. Hence, a no-fault approach to discrimination is less likely to cause moral hazard




society-wide economic gain through increased efficiency.39 Alterna-
tively, such a desire might be based on a broadly held sense of re-
sponsibility-the notion that something should be done about this
wrongful distribution and that failure to do so will implicate the mo-
rality of our society.40 To the extent that rational discrimination ex-
acerbates (rather than merely reflects or perpetuates) the
correlation between race and risk and affects the resulting distribu-
tion of benefits, this sense of responsibility is heightened.4 1 Further,
distributive effects aside, we might want to restrain rational discrimi-
nation because of its "dignitary" costs-both economic and
psychological. 42
Whatever the reason, there is some indication that our society (or
at least certain jurisdictions within our society), wishes to address
the no-fault aspects of race discrimination-that portion of the un-
just distribution of society's benefits for which no at-fault party can
be identified. This is particularly evident in both the construction
and insurance industries. 43 Given this desire to address this distri-
bution, it is necessary to examine ways to accomplish this goal. I
39. To the extent that cost barriers to entry permit inefficient incumbents to en-
trench themselves, any redistribution which encourages new entry into the market
should increase competition and, hence, efficiency. Any producer who was previously
able to "coast," her market share protected by the barriers created by difficult entry into
the market, will have to maximize efficiency or risk losing market share to upstarts. This
proposition finds empirical support in Leonard, Anti-discrimination or Reverse Discrimina-
tion: The Impact of Changing Demographics, Title VII, and Affirmative Action on Productivity, 19J.
Hubt. RESOURCES 145, 171 (1984) (new minority entry caused by race-conscious affirma-
tive action programs failed to cause expected efficiency losses in markets).
40. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instru-
mental Rationality, 46 S. CALIF. L. REv. 617, 618 (1973) (constitutive conception of social
choice: decision defines decision-maker).
41. See supra Section I, B (rational discrimination may perpetuate, or perhaps even
exacerbate, racial disadvantage).
42. Rational discrimination tells the black victim of such discrimination: "You are
not likely to succeed because you are Black." The more a black potential entrepreneur is
told this, the more likely she is to believe that it is true for her personally and the less
likely she is even to try to succeed. It is fairly well documented that repeated exposure
to the mere vocalization of such a sentiment can lead to mindless acceptance of its truth-
fulness as applied to the listener. See E. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 25, 52-53, 82-84 (1989)
(detailing psychological tendency to translate statistical statements into categorical
mindsets-i.e., statement regarding likelihood that listener is afflicted interpreted as
"fact" that listener is afflicted-and costs of such mindlessness, including inefficiency
and poor health). The Supreme Court, as well, recognizes "the danger of stigmatic
harm." City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989).
43. Many of the voluntary affirmative action programs that have been adopted by
legislatures deal with the construction industry. E.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (minority set-aside plan for municipal construction con-
tracts); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (minority set-aside plan for Federal
contracts). Legal prohibitions on rational discrimination by insurers may be seen as
indicative of a desire to redistribute risk and its costs in those markets in the absence of
demonstrated fault.
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will compare the distributive effects, practicality, and legality of two
possible approaches: a prohibition on rational discrimination and a
risk differential subsidy.
II. Evaluating a Prohibition on Rational Discrimination
A prohibition may be useful in combatting racial risk differentials
and the undesirable effects of rational discrimination. If insurers
are not allowed to distinguish between a Black risk pool and a White
risk pool, the pools will merge. To the extent that Blacks are
"higher risk" than Whites, this merger will result in decreased rates
for Blacks relative to Whites. The relative cost of doing business
will fall for Blacks, increasing prospects for success, and thus even-
tually reducing risk.
A prohibition's effect on cost structure and risk, as well as its dis-
tributive effects, can be illustrated with a graphic model. Imagine a
pool of potential producers who, given the opportunity, would enter
an entrepreneurial market. The pool can be ranked, according to
the level of cost at which each would-be entrepreneur could pro-
duce; the lowest cost producer should have the greatest likelihood
of entering the market successfully. 44 The number of producers who
can actually enter the market will depend on the size of the market
and the productive capacity of the individual firms. This model can




# # ## ## # # ## ##
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The pool of twelve potential entrants is ranked from lowest cost
(#:1), to highest cost (# 12). In this model, the market has room for
the top six producers (# 1-6).
The potential entrepreneurs can be broken down into two
groups, Whites (+) and Blacks (*). In the absence of discrimina-
tion, the cost structures of Blacks and Whites should be roughly the
same. Hence, the market should look like this:






White +++ + + +
6 5 4 3 2 1
Black * * * * * *
6 5 4 3 2 1
After a prolonged period of discriminatory acts against Blacks,
however, the groups will no longer be similarly situated relative to
the entry line. Blacks, as a group will have been pushed backward
(as a result of increased cost structures), and Whites pushed for-
ward, so that the pools might look like this:
Figure 3:
ENTRY
White + + + + + +
6 5 4 3 2 1
Black * * * * * *
6543 2 1
An insurer does not look at individuals; she looks at groups. Thus
an insurer looking at the market in Figure 3 will see Blacks, as a
group, as relatively high risk for any policy that reflects the risk of
business failure. Accordingly, if she rationally discriminates, she
will charge higher rates for Blacks than Whites. However, if rational
discrimination (including "impact" rational discrimination) is com-
pletely and successfully prohibited , she will be forced to see the
market as it was in Figure 2 (above). While the insurer might still
subdivide the groups by other proxies for risk, she will have to
charge the same rates for Blacks and Whites as groups, despite the
different underlying risks. Blacks' rates and, hence their production
costs, will fall, while Whites' costs will increase. Blacks will thus be
given an advantage in the market relative to Whites. The groups
will therefore shift such that the market might look like this:
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Figure 4:
ENTRY
White -- + + + + + +
6 5 4 3 2 1
Black * * * * * * __*
6 5 4 3 2 1
Figure 4 illustrates how a prohibition on rational discrimination
would push the market closer to what it would look like in a just
world. The question remains, however, who will bear the costs of
such a policy.
A. Costs on "Innocent" Insureds
As the previous analysis suggests, a prohibition on rational dis-
crimination increases white producers' insurance rates by merging
the black and white applicant pools. In this sense, a prohibition ef-
fectively exacts a "tax" from all white insureds and provides a quasi-
"subsidy" for all black insureds. The "tax" on white insureds, how-
ever, will fall most heavily on the marginal white entrants. As Figure
4, above, illustrates, the marginal white entrant, W5, loses her place
in the market as a result of the prohibition. As a marginal producer,
she was "just making ends meet" before the prohibition. The "tax"
she must pay as a result of the prohibition raises her costs, forcing
her out of the market. She is effectively replaced by the marginal
black entrant, B2. Lower cost white producers, by contrast, should
survive the cost increase.
The model, however, suggests that "innocent" 45 white producers,
like W5, may reasonably be asked to bear this burden. Arguably,
these marginal white entrants would not have been able to enter the
market in the absence of discriminatory exclusion since they would
have had to compete against more formidable black aspirants, like
B2, for the marginal place in the market. Similarly, the greatest
benefits of a racial rate prohibition would go to the most qualified
black producers who, but for discriminatory exclusion, would have
captured the market share currently held by marginal Whites.46
45. In the following sections, I refer to certain insurers and insureds as "innocent"
in the sense that they did not contribute to the correlation between race and risk
through intentional discrimination. Hence, these actors can not be said to be at "fault".
46. The foregoing analysis, it may be noted, assumes that discrimination has affected
all members of each group equally; that all Whites have benefitted equally from discrimi-




The burden imposed on W5, however, may not be entirely justi-
fied. While W5 might not have "deserved" her place in the market
in a perfectly just world, she clearly expected to be able to keep that
place once she attained it. Based on this expectation, she spent time
working in a given market that could have been spent developing a
niche in another market. Further, she invested in her business and
possibly encouraged others to invest as well. These investments
might include such items as education, tools, and real estate. To the
extent that these investments are specific to this particular market,
she will lose their value when she is forced out. The losses resulting
from a change in "the rules" of the market may be analogized to
"reliance" or "expectation" costs from a breach of contract.47
B. Costs on Insurers
A second group is likely to be burdened by a prohibition of ra-
tional discrimination: "innocent" insurers. As noted above, a prohi-
bition of rational discrimination raises the price of insurance for
white producers and lowers the price for black producers. As a re-
sult, marginal Whites will exit the insurance market, and Blacks will
enter. Because these Blacks will be higher risk individuals than the
Whites they replace, the amount and cost of risk in the market will
increase. As insurance companies raise the average price of insur-
ance to compensate for the increased cost, total demand for insur-
ance will fall. Through this process-called "adverse selection" 4 8-
insurers will lose business.
affected ranking within the groups as well as between them, implicating the fairness of
helping the marginal black competitor, B2, at the expense of the marginal white one,
W5. No evidence, however, appears to suggest that current intragroup rankings are the
result of differential impact from past discrimination. Absent such evidence, I will as-
sume that there has been no such differential intragroup impact.
47. To continue this analogy, we might imagine that W5 entered into an implicit
contract with the government in which the government agreed to refrain from interfer-
ing with the market. In reliance on this contract, suppose that W5 invested $1000 in
education. If the government breaches, prohibiting rational discrimination, W5 loses
the place which she occupied in this market. If she loses the full value of the investment
as a result of a breach, W5 might claim "reliance" damages of $ 1000, the amount of the
investment lost as a result of the breach. (If her investment has a "scrap value," how-
ever, as is likely, her reliance costs will fall by that amount.) In addition, she might claim
as "expectation" damages the amount of return she expected to earn from the invest-
ment in addition to the recoupment of her original $1000, say $500, for a total of $1500.
This amount would represent her loss from the prohibition of rational discrimination; it
is the cost which a change in "the rules" places on a marginal producer.
48. "Adverse selection" will occur whenever insurers fail to distinguish high risk
groups from low risk ones. The extent of adverse selection will depend on the certainty
with which insureds can know that they are either high risk or low risk and the strength
of their need for insurance (their demand elasticities). See Rothschild and Stiglitz, Equi-
librium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfection, 90 QJ.
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The shrinkage in the insurance market might be offset, to some
extent, by two long-run effects of the prohibition. First, with time,
new black producers will gain experience and wealth in the underly-
ing market, reducing their risk and offsetting some of the effects of
adverse selection. In addition, the influx of new producers caused
by the prohibition is likely to raise the level of competition in the
underlying market. 49 Increased competition may increase efficiency
in that market, reducing production costs, and hence price. At a
lower price, more production will be demanded, increasing demand
for insurance coverage.
In the short run, nevertheless, insurers will face the cost of a
smaller "pie." The costs of this temporary reduction in the market
will fall most heavily on marginal insurers who were just making
ends meet prior to the imposition of the prohibition. Such marginal
insurers will face expectation and reliance costs similar to those
faced by the marginal producer, W5.50 Moreover, unlike the margi-
nal producer, the "innocent" marginal insurer cannot be seen as a
beneficiary of the unjust distribution of risk that has resulted from
past intentional discrimination. The insurer's claim of "innocence"
thus seems stronger.
C. Practical Considerations
A prohibition that focuses solely on "overt" rational discrimina-
tion--decision making that explicitly uses race as a proxy-would be
simple to implement and enforce. A number of jurisdictions, as
noted earlier, have indeed instituted such a policy in the insurance
industry.5 1 Yet, so long as insurers are free to classify risks accord-
ing to racially correlated proxies such as experience or wealth/in-
come, Blacks will continue to pay more for insurance and thus will
continue to be handicapped in lucrative markets. While a prohibi-
tion limited to "overt" rational discrimination might stop the insult
of being categorized as high risk simply on the basis of race, it would
not eliminate the injury caused by perpetuating a cycle of racial
exclusion.
ECON. 629 (1976); Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Infonnation, 16 J.
ECON. THEORY 167 (Dec. 1977). The fact that insurance is compulsory in a market will
not prevent adverse selection. While a marginal White insured will be required to buy
insurance if she remains in production, the premium imposed upon her may force her
out of business altogether (supra Section II, A). This is a form of adverse selection.
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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If, on the other hand, the prohibition were to be extended to all
measures of risk that correlate with race,52 insureds ultimately
would be left without any criteria with which to measure the risk of
business failure. Indeed, so long as risk and race are correlated,
every characteristic that can successfully identify high risk insureds
will also identify Blacks to some degree; its use will create a dispa-
rate impact. Thus, a comprehensive prohibition of all racially corre-
lated proxies might cause serious damage to the insurance market.53
This would hurt insurers, all those who would choose to buy insur-
ance, and actors in markets that depend on insurance for their
viability.
Under these circumstances, the best solution is likely to be a com-
promise. Rather than a complete ban on rational discrimination, in-
surers might be prohibited only from using those factors that are
most highly correlated with race. Under this "limited" prohibition,
insurers would be forced to use less efficient, but not completely
inefficient, predictors of risk. Black insureds would, on average,
face reduced premiums, though Blacks' rates would remain higher,
on average, than those of Whites. Thus while benefits to Blacks
would be smaller under the limited prohibition, the burden borne
by Whites would be accordingly less severe.
D. Legal Considerations
A prohibition on rational discrimination does not appear vulnera-
ble to legal attack. While several jurisdictions have instituted lim-
ited bans on rational discrimination by insurers,5 4 none of these
regulations has been challenged in any federal court.
Other laws that interfere with businesses' ability to rationally dis-
criminate are regularly upheld. For example, Title VII often pre-
vents employers from making cost-based decisions that result in a
52. In other words, the prohibition would include both "impact" and "overt" ra-
tional discrimination.
53. At the very least, such a prohibition would interfere with the role of insurers as
we know it. Insurers might continue to operate either as "savings banks" (where in-
sureds estimate how much they will need to cover risks and place this money with insur-
ance companies) or "lotteries" (where insureds all pay the same "premium," gambling
that they may be awarded the payoff). Such markets would not serve the efficiency func-
tion of insurance as we know it: reducing the total effective risk through classification
and the law of large numbers. See Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality, 12
EcoN. INOUIRY 476 (1974).
54. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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racially disparate impact-that is, from engaging in "impact" ra-
tional discrimination. 5 These decisions, furthermore, all appear to
be based on statutory interpretation. Thus, even though the courts
have interpreted some statutes to permit certain kinds of rational
discrimination, 58 this does not imply that other statutes could not be
drafted to prohibit the practice entirely. There has been no sugges-
tion of any sort that a "right" to rational discrimination exists.
III. Subsidizing Risk Differentials
Irrespective of the probable legality of a prohibition on rational
discrimination, we have seen that such a scheme presents certain
practical and moral problems. Specifically, a workable, or "limited,"
prohibition will fail to address fully the unjust distribution of risk
that has resulted from "faultless" discrimination. Indeed, even a
limited prohibition will burden "innocent" white insureds and in-
surers, particularly those at the margin. It might be possible to
avoid some of the problems of a prohibition, while achieving the
same benefits, by using a risk differential subsidy.
Under a subsidy plan, insurers would be permitted to rationally
discriminate.5 7 While insurance rates for black producers would re-
main higher than those paid by Whites, the government would pro-
vide a subsidy to black producers, paying some portion of their
insurance premiums. This would effectively reduce the cost struc-
ture faced by black producers, increase their prospects for success,
and eventually reduce their risk.58
55. E.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
717 (1978) (Title VII prohibits rational discrimination in operation of employee benefit
plan).
56. E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126-27 (1989) (Title
VII permits hiring practice which yields disparate impact ifjustified by business purpose;
cost of alternative selection devices relevant to business purpose justification). See also
Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318, 320
(1987) (courts have frequently accepted a cost defense in Title VII disparate impact
cases).
57. Overt rational discrimination still might be prohibited under such a subsidy,
since its "dignitary" or "insult" costs would be difficult to compensate. See supra note
42.
58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. It might be asked, at this point, why
limit the remedy for wrongful distribution to a subsidy of risk differentials? The differen-
tial cost of risk is only one of many barriers to Black entry in most entrepreneurial indus-
tries. As long as Blacks, on average, are less qualified than Whites in any way, it may
make sense for buyers of entrepreneurial services to engage in rational discrimination
(impact, if not overt, treatment). To effectively knock down all barriers to entry which
are reflective of past discrimination it may be necessary to use a broader subsidy, such as
a "set-aside" program. A set-aside effectively says to Blacks (in the context of govern-
ment contracting): Whatever it costs you to successfully enter the market-to get quali-




As the following sections suggest, a subsidy plan does not com-
pletely eliminate the burden on "innocents." In contrast to a prohi-
bition, however, a subsidy distributes the bulk of these costs onto
taxpayers as a whole rather than onto a narrow group of insurers
and insureds. This is consistent with the no-fault approach elabo-
rated in Section I-C, which attempts to spread burdens among as
large a group of beneficiaries as possible.
A. Costs on "Innocent" Insureds
Like a prohibition, a subsidy will impose a burden upon white
producers. Indeed, aid given to a some producers in a competitive
market will inevitably disadvantage unaided producers. Blacks, with
lower, subsidized, costs will enter the market, forcing out marginal
Whites.59 Like those forced out of the market by the prohibition,
these marginal Whites will suffer reliance and expectation costs. 60
On the other hand, fewer white producers will be adversely af-
fected by a subsidy plan. This is because, unlike a prohibition, the
market for producers' goods will expand under a government sub-
sidy.61 Thus, instead of replacing white producers in the market,
many of the new black entrants will simply fill newly made positions.
As a result, the costs imposed upon innocent insureds by a subsidy
may be less significant than those caused by a prohibition.
B. Costs on Insurers
Unlike a prohibition, a subsidy plan is unlikely to impose a burden
upon innocent insurers. In fact, the subsidy should actually benefit
insurers by increasing the size of the insurance market. In contrast
to a prohibition, the subsidy offsets the higher risk of entering
Blacks. Thus, market shrinkage through "adverse selection" will be
avoided.62 In addition, the subsidy reduces the risk costs of those
increases in education), simply bid more for the project and, if your bid is competitive
among black bidders, it will be accepted. Such an approach has the advantage of coordi-
nating the many markets which affect the contracting industry. Such a plan, however,
was recently struck down in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727
(1989). Thus, while some form of set-aside might still survive Supreme Court scrutiny, a
less sweeping remedy might be more favorably received. Id. at 727-28 (evidence
presented by defendant city will not support use of set-aside; court suggests need for
more "tailored" approach). For a discussion of the legality of a risk-differential subsidy,
see infra Section III, D.
59. This is essentially the same effect as that caused by the prohibition, graphically
depicted in Figure 4. See supra Section III.
60. See supra note 47 and preceding text.
61. Market growth typically occurs as a result of an "externalizing" subsidy. See infra
Section III, B.
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Blacks who were already in the market. Thus, the subsidy effectively
shifts some of the cost of risk from actors in the market (black in-
sureds) to actors outside of the market (taxpayers), reducing the to-
tal cost of risk in the market. It "externalizes" some of the market's
risk. This will reduce the cost of insurance and, hence, its price. At
a reduced price, demand for insurance will increase. Insurers will
gain business.63
C. Practical Considerations
A subsidy also has practical advantages over a prohibition. A pro-
hibition requires a compromise. Any attempt to extend a ban to all
racially correlated factors will impair insurers' ability to perform
their job of classifying risk. A subsidy, in comparison, can be easily
implemented and can remedy all forms of rational discrimination. It
simply requires insurers to measure the amount by which Blacks'
risk exceeds that of Whites.
This difference can be obtained from the actuarial tables of any
insurer who uses "overt" rational discrimination. It is the amount
that the category "Black" adds to such a producer's insurance pre-
mium. Even if no insurer overtly rationally discriminates, accurate
estimates of risk differentials could be measured indirectly from
other proxies that correlate closely with race. Standard actuarial
techniques can translate these risk differentials into the monetary
cost of rectifying racial disparities in insurance.64
D. Legal Considerations
Government subsidies to help minority businesses and individuals
are fairly common. 65 These subsidies, like the risk differential sub-
sidy, give Blacks an advantage, or "plus," over Whites in competing
63. The gain to insurers may be considered an undeserved windfall. As such, we
might want to tax it. Such a tax, however, would offset some of the gains from the
subsidy; it would reduce market growth by increasing the cost of bonding insurance.
Fewer Blacks could then enter the market and a greater number of Whites would be
forced to exit.
64. By quantifying these risk differentials, a subsidy provides a concrete measure-
ment of the cost of redistribution. This contrasts with a prohibition, where these costs
are somewhat hidden and obscured. Whether the forthright quality of the subsidy
would prove a liability or an asset is certainly debatable. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178 (1982) for a general discussion of the value of candor
in the law.
65. See, e.g., Berry, With Some Federal Aid, Minority Banks Flourish, Wash. Post, July 19,
1982, Wash. Bus. Sec., at I (Treasury channels money to minority-owned banks); Selig-
man,A' Wider War on Poverty, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1981, at 37 (U.S. Small Business Admin-




for scarce positions.66 Racial "plus" plans have regularly been up-
held by the courts. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, for example,
the Supreme Court approved a plan by a government employer that
awarded minority applicants a "plus" in promotion decisions.6 7
Two factors suggest that the Court might view a risk differential
subsidy even more favorably than the "plus" plan upheld in Johnson.
First, the risk differential subsidy has less impact on marginal Whites
than Johnson's "plus" plan. As suggested in previous sections, the
risk differential subsidy is likely to expand the market, reducing the
number of Whites forced out by the plan. 68 The Johnson plan, by
contrast, is not likely to expand the market. Hence, the impact of
the Johnson plan on Whites is unlikely to be mitigated. The Court
has expressed a clear preference for plans that minimize the burden
placed on innocent marginal Whites.6 9
Also, in contrast to the plaintiff in Johnson, an unsuccessful White
who seeks to challenge the risk differential subsidy would have a dif-
ficult time establishing that her lack of success-her injury-was
caused by the subsidy. In Johnson the applicants were competing for
a specific position in which an objective measure (a scored inter-
view) was available to determine the relative qualifications of the ap-
plicants. Thus the trial court could conclude that the non-minority
status of the unsuccessful applicant was the "determining factor" in her
failure. 70 An unsubsidized white entrepreneur forced out of the
market, however, can draw only a tenuous link between her failure
and the subsidy plan. It would be virtually impossible for her to
establish with any degree of certainty that the subsidy was a "but
Demkovich, Let it Simmer, NAT'LJ.,June 20, 1981, at 1128 (Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act provides wage subsidy for minority youth).
66. The term "plus" is used to distinguish a plan that places non-minority applicants
at a disadvantage in competing for scarce positions from one which completely fore-
closes non-minorities from vying for those positions (i.e., a "quota"). See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
67. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638, 641-42 (1987). Note that
whileJohnson was a sex discrimination case, the Court explicitly stated that their analysis
applied to minorities as well as to women. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 635 n.13.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. The Court's preference for plans with a minimal impact on innocents is apparent
in the structure of affirmative action doctrine. Essentially, the greater the impact of an
affirmative action plan, the stronger its justification must be. Thus, a particular justifica-
tion which supports a low-impact ("plus") plan might not support a high-impact
("quota") plan. Compare johnson, 480 U.S. at 634, 638 (desire to remedy minority under-
representation in scarce job categories resulting from past societal discrimination justi-
fies use of "plus" plan) with City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 724
(1989) (desire to remedy past societal discrimination cannot justify use of unyielding
racial quota). Though its impact is even less severe, a risk differential subsidy is based
on a justification which is virtually identical to that accepted by the Court in Johnson.
70. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
457
Yale Law & Policy Review
for" cause of her injury. The Court, in fact, has indicated that the
"injury" from a subsidy may not be "fairly traceable to the
government. 7'
V Conclusion
Although rational discrimination is based on neutral market prin-
ciples such as profitability and efficiency, its effects are far from neu-
tral. In the insurance market, rational discrimination plays a part in
perpetuating-even exacerbating-the economic disparities be-
tween the races. This seemingly "faultless" conduct not only is
rooted in the harm of past intentional discrimination, it is a harm in
its own right.
This article suggests that a subsidy, rather than a prohibition, of-
fers the best approach for remedying the effects of rational discrimi-
nation in the insurance industry. A subsidy minimizes the costs
imposed on innocent insureds and insurers, while offering Blacks
long awaited opportunities to succeed in the marketplace. In con-
trast to a prohibition, which proves unable to eradicate fully rational
discrimination (without impairing the insurance market's viability), a
subsidy compensates Blacks for the entire differential in risk arising
from economic and social disadvantage.
Nevertheless, even a subsidy imposes a burden on "innocent" in-
dividuals. It will drive marginal white producers from the market.
Even if these Whites would not have succeeded without historical
injustice, we cannot lightly dismiss the burden imposed on these in-
nocent Whites. At the very least, the government's intervention
changes "the rules" of the market and violates the expectations and
plans of established competitors. It must be recognized, however,
that any time society changes-even if the transformation is toward
a more just state-the expectations and assumptions of certain citi-
zens will be violated. In a sense, this cost is ultimately the cost of
justice.
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71. Cf Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (parents of black students lack
standing to sue government for subsidizing all-white private school, thereby diminishing
their educational opportunities).
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